In October 2007, the Centre for Islamic Pluralism condemned the reported seizure of NMO by Islamist radicals. Dutch media stated that the subversion of NMO was a product of a policy decision by an official monitoring agency, the Media Commission (Commissaariat (sic) voor de Media — CvdM), which dictated that NMO be combined with the “orthodox” NIO so that Muslims would have a single broadcast service in the Netherlands. NMO was previously run by Dutch members of the Alevi movement, and also included representatives of the Ahmadi sect, but Alevi and Ahmadi personnel were reportedly expelled from NMO. (…)
Nevertheless, the Dutch government has assumed a posture identical to that of the German federal power in calling for the establishment of a single Muslim organisation, uniting all groups, to simplify relations between non-Muslim authorities and the Muslims. The goal is, as cited in Case Study: Germany above, to have one “telephone number” as a means of reference for non-Muslim leaders. Unfortunately, as in Germany, such a requirement ignores the substantial differences between Wahhabi, Deobandi, and other fundamentalist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), claiming the mantle of Sunnism, and heterodox spiritual and ethnic communities like the Alevis and Berbers. In addition, a similar trend toward homogenisation, which may seem positive to immigration experts but which we consider an obstacle to the defeat of radical Islam, is visible in France and Spain.

“Parallel Shariah” implies separation of Muslims living in the West from their non- Muslim neighbors. This is in itself a radical attitude. But the erection of a “parallel Shariah” could also open a space for the introduction of radical Shariah principles, since, in a Muslim-only legal structure, Muslim representatives of varying orientations could gain authority. For example, even a minimal “parallel Shariah” could come under the direction and administration of radicals who would exploit it to impose their own views.

In its own way, Wahhabi Saudi Arabia, where ultramodern cities and nomadic customs exist side-by-side, and which exports ideology and finance more than people, is an urban environment with rural values, which is one of the reasons practices inimical to women are established there (…)
Radical Shariah demands a regressive transformation: a “Muslim-ruled state” is insufficient, and must be replaced by a theocratic “Islamic state” in which Shariah is the sole legal system.

Muslim violations of and challenges to common law in Western countries were rare until the rise of radical Shariah ideology at the end of the 20th century.

Radical Shariah is institutionalised in few Muslim countries: chiefly, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Sudan (without great success), and some areas of Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia and Nigeria. Radical Shariah holds that the West is an area of unbelief and that Muslims living in Western lands cannot obey Western laws but must establish their own Islamic legal standard.

A Kuwaiti Sunni cleric, Shaykh Yusuf ibn al-Sayyid Hashim Al-Rifa’i, notes that the Saudi regime permits Wahhabis to shout at the Prophet’s Shrine, “‘The father and mother of the Prophet, peace and greetings be upon him, are in hellfire! The father and mother of the Prophet, peace and greetings be upon him, are in hellfire!’ “ The Wahhabi rationalization for this perverse behavior rests on the allegation that the parents of Muhammad, having died before the Prophet received the revelation of Qur’an, were not Muslims and are therefore not saved from perdition. The consensus of Muslim scholars, however, denies this charge and relies on the argument, among other points, that ignorance of Islam could not condemn the Prophet’s parents.

With the present text the Centre for Islamic Pluralism inaugurates a new feature: profiles of outstanding moderate (sic) Muslims of recent times, whom we honor as Guardians of Islamic Pluralism. (…)
In the first such article, we present the biography of Sayyid Muhammad ibn ‘Alawi ibn ‘Abbas ibn Abd al-Aziz Al-Maliki. Sayyid al-Maliki was prominent in Hejaz, until his death in 2004, as a stern opponent of Wahhabism. (…)
Having succeeded his father in Mecca, he maintained the tradition of indefatigable teaching for over thirty years. Even when he was prevented from teaching in the Mosque by the Wahhabis, who had declared him an apostate, the school which he had started in his own house remained active.